The Industry
As we enter the 21st century, the automotive industry finds itself in a quite difficult situation. The growth rate of the European car market is near zero and the worlds most important economy, North America, has been hit massively by the worldwide economic downturn after the end of the .com hype and as a result of 9/11/01. In t he 1930s there were approximately 300 independent car manufacturers, by the end of the 1990s seven independent manufacturers remained. The industry structure is currently stable and further consolidation, due to legal aspects, is unlikely.
In the light v ehicle market, the five largest manufactures 1 have a market share of about 70 percent. And competition is tough. According to The Economist (see Fig. 1 ), the car industry is operating with increasing overcapacity. Vehicle sales in the NAFTA region have decreased and the car market in Western Europe is stagnant. Furthermore, customers demand better service and faster delivery. Market transparency has increased with the advent of the internet.
As demand is volatile, manufacturers are driven to cut costs (e.g. by economies of scale), maximize flexibility and foster customer loyalty. As for example, an average C-Class model from Mercedes Benz consists of approximately 260.000 parts, the coordination of suppliers from all over the world is a major challenge. According to Davis (2001) it "takes an average of 54 days to get a car built and deliverd to its customer today while only one or two of those days are actually spent on assembly; a full 36 days go by, according to a report by Roland Berger in June 2000, creating a schedule for production processing orders for materials and purchasing supplies."
1 General Motors, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Volkswagen, Toyota 
The Challenge
In 1998, corporate headquarters in Stuttgart and Auburn Hills were busy managing the consequences of the merger. Although operating profits rose (o.V. 1998) , not all analysts where convinced that the merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler would unfold as a success story. The shareprice took a nosedive in late 1998: The merger was difficult to manage not only because of cultural differences -employees of both companies had strong ties to their local sites and cultures. Furthermore, financial pressure drove the company's executives and engineers to push for economies such as platform-and component-sharing. However, as business processes of the two companies where quite different, quick wins due to synergies where not on the horizon: For example, Chrysler deployed platform teams for the development of new cars whereas Mercedes-Benz used cross functional units (such as electronics or gear systems) for all series.
During spring 1999, the Lagezentrum (Corporate Strategic Research and Control Center) at the headquarters in Stuttgart perceived that new ways of doing business where breaking ground. The Lagezentrum had been established in 1995 to generate strategic intelligence for the Board of Directors. The staff recognized increasing media coverage for e-commerce and conducted some preliminary surveys and analyses. Olaf Koch, then head of the Lagezentrum, describes the situation as follows: The analysis of the Lagezentrum focused on three major areas: 1) sales processes and the value chain, 2) product features 3) supply chain.
Sales processes and the value chain:
New players like autobytel.com or Microsofts CarPoint entered the car market swiftly. They stepped into the car makers value chain between dealers and customers. The purpose of these companies was not only to sell cars on the internet, but also to provide information transparency, sell related services like information on current incentives or rebates, and to capitalize direct contact to customers by supporting parts of the retail process.
Product features:
For example, GMs OnStar initiative focused on telematic services like personalized information and safety services to foster ongoing contact between OEM and the customer. With the advent of smart phones, telecom companies tried to equip cars with enhanced information and communication capabilities (see i-mode of NTT DoCoMo in Japan or E-Plus in Germany).
3. Supply chain: E-Business allows the optimization of supply processes and could provide a viable business case through global marketplaces, which would allow suppliers, dealers and other business partners to do business with each others online.
Based on the results of the analysis which were embedded in the description of initiatives of DaimlerChryslers major competitors (General Motors and Ford), the Board of Directors demanded the Lagezentrum to examine e-business related activities of each division. By the beginning of March 2000, Dr. Grube presented a status quo report at a Board Meeting: Although most divisions used the Internet for marketing purposes, that is, they displayed information about their products and organization, only minor effort had been spent on the design of transaction or collaboration oriented systems on the demand/supply side of its value chain. Furthermore, activities were fragmented and lacked central coordination. By the end of march, survey teams were deployed to discuss the opportunities of eBusiness from each division's standpoint. The survey teams were equipped with a questionnaire to guide and structure the discussions.
One of the underlying assumptions of this process was, that success was dependent on a bottum-up definition of e-Business. The most important reason for that was the relationship between experience and learning. Olaf Koch describes the relationship as follows: The presentation started with a strategic outlook section, given by Dr. Grube. This section portrayed the current situation and scenarios of selected topics. These included brand portals, telematics, market places, built-to-order cars, e-financing and others. The discussion about current e-business topics led to three questions to be adressed by the divisions: The answer on these questions was an e-business action plan for each division (Fig. 3) .
4 see (Erdener 2000 After the strategic outlook session, the divisions presentet their vision of the internet as a business process enabler. The discussion among board members and executives from the divisions resulted in five high priority action plans in the B2C and B2B areas:
B2C: Action plans were developed to define and execute a DCX portal strategy, a content and portal alliances strategy and to build interactive relationships to customers. To support the buying process, it was planned to bring all transaction capabilities online. An evaluation of the direct sales approach was launched. Furthermore, a set of measures was developed to keep the contact to the customer.
B2B:
In order to increase the speed from order to delivery, e-engineering and e-manufacturing initiatives were discussed. In addition, it was planned to strengthen the relationship to the dealers by electronic means.
To achieve efficiency and effectiveness improvements, it was clear that a crucial issue of ebusiness implementation would be deep interaction of backend systems at DaimlerChrysler. Thus, the information technology function (ITM) had to be a central part of DCXNET efforts. To achieve its goals, DCXNET Initiative has been organized as shown in Fig. 4 .
Fig. 4: Organization of DCXNET
The organizational structure reflects the international core of DaimlerChrysler's activities. Furthermore, it reflects the change management approach of DaimlerChrysler. The Board did not install a separate business unit, they did not hire an external consultancy to encourage and monitor change. DCXNET has been staffed with ‚car guys' from several business divisions and functional areas inside DaimlerChrysler.
The DCXNET Holding integrated and monitored all financial stakes of the company with relation to e-Business. Olaf Koch was head of strategy on the corporate level as well as ebusiness development. Together with John Stellman, Koch lead the DCXNET Holding. Gary Dilts (Senior Vice President, eConnect Platform DaimlerChrysler) back then was responsible for the operative e-business integration at the Chrysler Group. He was also responsible for coordination of all e-business activities in the NAFTA region. Harald Schuff (Senior Vice President, Development Sales Organisation) was responsible for all such activities outside the NAFTA region and for Mercedes-Benz passenger cars and commercial vehicles. Both are also in charge of the development of marketing strategies for their respective areas of responsibility.
The organization reports directly to the Board of Directors. These report meetings (internally called e-Business council) took place monthly as part of a Board Meeting and served as a coordination mechanism between all organizational units involved. Participants at these meetings were Board Members, the four e-business managers (Olaf Koch, Gary Dilts, Harald These principles reflect the implicit role model of the Corporate e-Business staff : they acted as moderators rather than advocates of change (Markus und Benjamin 1996) . Although people at DCXNET were formally internal to DaimlerChrysler, they were viewed as outsiders in relation to the change target. Thus, they were well aware of collective identities and emotional dispositions of their target groups (Fiol und O'Connor 2002, 533) .
Components of DCXNET
DCXNET consists of the following components: Following discussions on the objectives of the initiative, teams consisting of people from DCXNET and the departments proposed projects within the key areas identified above. The basis for these projects were the presentations, given by the divisions in March 2000 and a considerable (550 Mio €) budget that was dedicated to be spent primarily on strategic investments to capture technology and intellectual capital. It even turned out later, that spending of the total amount was not even necessary.
Business Connect
The greatest efficiency gains were expected in the B2B area. The challenge to foresee the demand for certain products in the auto industry is more difficult than in other industries, due to longer and complex product creation and production cycles. Building a complete new segment busting model like the Chrysler PT Cruiser always implies lots of uncertainties about the market reaction and acceptance and therefore the volume planning (see Konicki 2001 for details)
Within Business Connect, a project was launched to help solving this problem. The FastCar initiative aims at connecting developers, suppliers and other functional units of DaimlerChrysler (e.g. marketing) in order to provide real time information about changes in the car configuration. "FastCar" is an Internet-based development platform that integrates the geometry of design with all its CAD-Data (Computer Aided Design) with the business infrastructure ( suppliers, procurement and finance systems). To realize this vision, DaimlerChrysler uses i2 and Dassault Systems CAD applications. It informs and enables all stakeholders during the development of a future Chrysler Group vehicle to make immediate decisions based upon changes in weight, cost, speed and technology of the design in order to accelerate the workflow within the vehicle development process. And it engages the suppliers into the process much earlier than in the past. The business rationale of FastCar is to shorten the development cycles and to overcome communcation barriers within the supply chain. Secondly, design accounts for only 5% of the overall development costs, but that 5 percent directly affects and impacts approximately 70% of the total costs of that vehicle (DCXNET Annual R eport 2001). Therefore, it is crucial to assess the impact of changes in the configuration in order to meet target costs of a development project.
According to Gerbert and Birch (2001) Covisint is an integral part of business connect within DCXNET. The functional focus of Covisint is to provide common web-based services in three areas: purchasing, supply chain management and joint product development as shown in Fig. 1 . The COVISINT platform offers services in the following areas: (1) Collaboration, (2) procurement (3) supply chain management, (4) quality management, (5) portal features. We will focus our description on items 1 -3.
In the collaboration area, the so-called ‚collaboration manager' provides a virtual project workspace, which facilitates information exchange, communication and coordination among members of virtual project teams.
In the procurement area, Covisint offers the following set of features:
Auctions/Online Biddings -after designers together with marketing and product creation come up with a specification of a new product, a manufacturer has to decide on which parts to make or buy from suppliers. Once this decision is reached, the car manufacturer traditionally enters in a so-called RFQ process -which consists basically of multiple rounds of negotiations. This time intensive activity is still a one-to-one activity that is conducted over a number of days.
Companies have identified a growing need to streamline processes by electronically enabling negotiations via the Internet. Buyers can decrease the time it takes to negotiate prices and create a one-to-many sourcing environment that promotes market pricing. With the Buyer Auction tool, a buyer can establish an on-line event, invite all the participating suppliers to submit bids and conduct the auction in a matter of hours (Source: Covisint). Harald Brunini, GPS Car Division DaimlerChrysler says: "Without the internet, complex negotiations took 8 to 10 weeks. Now with online bidding events we can close a deal within 4-5 days" (Source: DCXNET Annual Report).
Quote Manager -is an electronic document management, analysis and collaboration tool that supports the automotive sourcing process. The tool provides a central, online repository of sourcing documentation, where documents can be posted, viewed, edited and/or downloaded by authorized users through a Web browser. Potential users of this product include purchasing, engineering and design representatives from both buying and selling organizations.
Catalog -in order to simplify the steps in the paperbased process by which indirect or maintenance repair and operation material (MRO) is purchased, Covisint offers a catalog service. The paperbased process involves the buyer in a timely process, scanning through different catalogs to find an item and manually create a requisition and submit it for approval. Once approved, the order will be sent by fax, mail or EDI to the supplier. With the calatalog feature, a buyer can order all MRO material online through a customized catalog.
Supply Chain Management -The supply chain management features of Covisint focus on fulfilment services for the automotive supply chain. It allows to share information about inventory levels usage history and patterns, forecast, in-transit inventories, receipts and other relevant information between buyer and suppliers and helps to eliminate excess inventory and premium transportation charges. The fulfilment service allows for real time information and enables buyer and supplier to respond quickly to changes in inventory levels and consumption.
Covisint started at the time of the dot-com hype with high aspirations, but nevertheless its success remains at least on a medium level. Suppliers did not buy in the solution as quickly as estimated -by mid January 2001 only 20 suppliers had signed up the new mega exchange. Covisint generates annual revenue of $60 Million, which is below projections (Sedgwick, Kisiel und Sherefkin 2002) . Kevin English, CIO of Covisint resigned in June 2002.
The successor of Kevin English is Harold Kutner, a former GM executive. When Kutner retired as General Motors' purchasing chief in 2001, three supplier CEOs were among the attendees at his farewell party. Kutner has a reputation as a tough negotiater, and asked later why they honored an executive who had made their lives so difficult, one supplier quipped, "We wanted to make sure he was really gone." (Sedgwick, Kisiel und Sherefkin 2002) .
Since the autumn of 2002 Kutner is back -with a different task, though. Rather than squeezing margins of suppliers, his mission is to convince them that the big three (GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler) will not use Covisint as a tool to increase time pressure and market transparency at their advantage only. Covisint's most popular service are reverse auctions, that is, suppliers bid for the right to sell a specific part or component to a manufacturer and the lowest bid wins. As a consequence, a lot of the approximately 7000 suppliers who use Covisint by mid 2002 do so because there is some pressure from manufacturers. A vice president of a mid-sized supplier insists not to use Covisint since "you can't put enough perfume on that pig to suggest that it represents quality, delivery or financial responsibility for suppliers {...} All Covisint does is look for low bids. It's just a bid-trolling process" (Sedgwick, Kisiel und Sherefkin 2002) . In order to turn Covisint into a profitable market platform, it is crucial to achieve a critival mass of transactions to break even. That will not work without suppliers...
Customer Connect
One of the most visible projects in the customer connect area is the Mercedes-Benz Portal (www.mercedes-benz. 
Vehicle Connect
Vehicle Connect refers to telematics solutions of DaimlerChrysler. Telematics focuses on IT enabled mobility services. Examples are:
• Information -general news, location based services, e-mail • Transaction -mobile commerce e.g. banking, tickets.
• Navigation -dynamic traffic information and navigation Berger, 38% of all car customers tend to include the availability of telematics services in their purchase decisions. Fig. 7 provides an overview of some automotive telematic projects launched in North America. 
Workforce Connect
DC eLife, as part of the DCXNET initiative focuses on qualification and networking the workforce of DaimlerChrysler. DC eLife is a joint initiative of the Corporate eBusiness, Communication, IT Management and Human Resources departments under the auspices of the Board of Management member responsible for human resources. The initiative includes all employee-related eBusiness activities that can be accessed through the employee portal. The portal bundles information, applications and services. DaimlerChrysler employees have access to this portal by a single sign on solution and can customize their personal portal site according to their job assignments and personal preferences. The portal displays time accounts, a job marketplace, company vehicle ordering among others. The ePeople project focuses on the standardization of administration processes related to human resources. The application is built on Peoplesoft and Paisy standard software with an underlying database and consists of three major elements:
1. Employee job marketplace -anonymous application for jobs within DaimlerChrysler 2. Competency management -identifying suitable skills and knowledge 3. Candidate management -standardized support for the recruitment process Although, DaimlerChrysler benefits from each project separately, the vision is to make DaimlerChrysler a networked company, the whole supply chain electronically, that is, employees, suppliers and customers. To avoid a scenario as described above (remember, the problem to meet market demand of the PT Cruiser), projects of the DCXNET initiative help to tie dealer's order management software to DaimlerChrysler's order management applications (FastCar) and to link facility management systems to production and inventory management systems (. A project manager is enabled to scan the corporate skillmap for talents needed and a networked supply chain avoids situations where one tier n supplier suffers from excess inventory and another one runs out of stock because sales forecasts did not match reality. Key is electronically enhanced flexibility, Gary Dilts says: "If you can assemble the car electronically, create a production schedule at the factory using real time tools, and handle fulfillment using another integrated set of tools, you can ramp up production very quickly." (Konicki 2001 ).
5 Results, Success Factors and Issues for the future
Results
When Olaf Koch met with Eckhard Cordes to negotiate the terms for his new assignment at DCXNET in 2000, his first question was, "Do you have the feeling, that our effort will make DaimlerChrysler more efficient and effective?". Both indices have direct impact on the balance sheet. The next section provides an overview of the achievments:
• Business Connect / FastCar: Early "FastCar" results have yielded a 60-90 percent reduction in the average time required to communicate changes to the vehicle development process. FastCar will also contribute significantly to the speed in which DaimlerChrysler will bring new vehicles to market, thereby increasing its competitive edge. Similarly, Günter Fleig, member of the Board and responsible for human resources says: "Through the internet and its application in DC e-life, we provide fast information access and allow for effective and efficient knowledge management. Thereby, we secure maximum flexibility of our employees and enhance our appeal as employer.".
Success Factors
The story of DCXNET is tied to a set of aspects that influenced its success: We will discuss these aspects in the next sections.
Diverse Role Model of Change Agents. Markus and Benjamin (1996, 385) identify role models for change agents and argue that "behavioural flexibility {...} -the ability to switch roles in different circumstances -would improve organizational effectiveness". Although the management philosophy of the DCXNET organization focused on cooperation and mediation, the use of e-business tools was all but optional. The pressure on DaimlerChryseler executives from outside rose steadily with every announcement of GM or Ford until March 2001. Consequently, the Board expected results from e-business efforts. So change agents have been in a dilemma: on the one hand, they had to win support from their partners in the divisions by cooperation. On the other hand, they had a clear assignment from the Board: enhance effectiveness and efficiency by electronic means.
The organization responded on this challenge in an interesting way. Firstly, DCXNET management hired staff from within DaimlerChrysler, well respected employees who had a strong network within the company. So, staff of DCXNET were familiar with communication codes and processes of their target groups and, "they could open doors to fields, where we could test some e-business functionality without great publicity" (Olaf Koch). Secondly, the Board monitored all activities (e-business council) and every division had to report directly to the Board, not to a DCXNET executive. Thereby, the Board had to be convinced, when goals were not achieved or projects stuck and DCXNET could play its role as a mediator. On the other hand, the Board tried to facilitate and accelerate e -business efforts by direct communication on a peer level. Thirdly, the preparation of e-business council meetings had a coordinating effect: Divisions and DCXNET staff had to orchestrate their activities in order to present a coherent picture of e-business activities to the Board. This effect provided some cohesive power in a turbulent and culturally diversive environment.
The role of the Board. The transformation of legacy processes into e-enabled business processes can't be achieved without a strong mandate from the board. After all, not all business units were amused by the idea of changing their processes. The authority of a decision made by the board of directors was the basis of the success of DCXNET: "Old hands" are to be convinced. In addition to the support by the Board of Directors, DCXNET staff had to win support of key players at DaimlerChrysler which had direct responsibility for the processes to be transformed by electronic means. As mentioned above, some businesses of DaimlerChrysler have considerable freedom in their lines of activity -and their performance is measured by a simple index: operating profit. As the salary of plant managers and division executives is tied to their performance by a certain degree, change agents have to be able to develop a viable business case together with their target groups: if ebusiness can be communicated as a potential profit booster, there is a strong incentive for executives to transform their businesses. That is why staff from DCXNET relied heavily on cooperation and not hierarchical coordination.
E-transformation as a process innovation can be characterized from a diffusion point of view. According to Rogers (1995, 5) , diffusion is "the process by w hich an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system". A key variable of diffusion obviously is communication. Communication provides for a mutually shared understanding of goals and tools in the change process. A crucial question for a change agent is, how to spread the message of e-enhanced processes. Old hands can be used for communication purposes, that is, their opinion leadership as "the degree to which an individual can informally influence other individuals' attitudes or overt behaviour in a desired way …" (Rogers 1995, 354) . If change agents get opinion leaders to use e-business tools, others will be more inclined to use them too: As Olaf Koch says, the commitment of Johannes Rudnitzky as a well respected executive was a breakthrough for DCXNET.
Cultural aspects of E-Transformation. DaimlerChrysler's employees have strong cultural ties with their local sites (on both sides of the ocean). Although the merger has taken place in 1998, the complete transformation into one company is still on its way. Unlike Chrysler, which has been run by a central coordination approch, Daimler-Benz allowed their managers significant autonomy, which resulted in strong plant cultures. When e-business is regarded as a toolset driven by operational units, the most important task of change agents is communication in direct interaction. That is, e-business managers and change agents had to adress their target groups in different ways according to their cultural disposition. Rogers (1995, 19) argues, that communication among people who are similar in certain attributes "is more likely to be effective". Thus, DCXNET staff and management has been chosen from the target group itself and they were able to get the message of e-business across. Lets have a closer look on the concept of culture. According to Schein (1984) , organizational culture can be described on three levels: As e-business aims at the transformation of work processes, the DCXNET initiative affected (and has been affected by) the organizational culture of DaimlerChrysler respectively the cultures of the divisions involved. For example, the FastCar project at Chrysler aimes toward more transparency and faster results in the development process. These goals are tied to information sharing and cooperation among developers within the company and even suppliers. Change agents will have a difficult time, if engineers don't feel comfortable with information sharing and cooperation. Even worse, if engineers come from former rivals like in the case of DaimlerChrysler, information hiding as a reaction to maintain local identities is a major threat for success. But, as Koch says, DCXNET did benefit from the merger in 1998: "The merger in 1999 was helpful for the DCXNET initiative. We were about to strengthen our international culture and people felt the need to network their activities on both sides of the ocean. For example, we established English as our corporate language and we introduced PMI 6 reporting structures based on a Lotus Notes application in 1999. This reflects our commitment to provide an anytime/anyplace office environments on international standards. Furthermore, our employees were familiar with electronic tools for business coordinationthus it was not necessary to run a separate ‚e-business culture' project. Most of our partners at DaimlerChrysler were familiar with basic elements of e-business related work practices".
Divisions are process owners. The transformation of conventional business processes towards a fully integrated value network at DaimlerChrysler has been driven from inside, not by an external unit. How can change agents achieve committment to change in their target groups? One crucial element of this achievment has been, that business units were responsible for the change process and not DCXNET. That is, DCXNET staff triggered, supported and monitored change processes on the basis of a business case. Process redesign and the deployment of ebusiness technology like the collaboration manager from Covisint or quality assurance tools from powerway.com were issues mainly to be adressed by business units, not DCXNET staff. Success and failure has been the responsibility of the business units -and both are compatible with the reward system of DaimlerChrysler.
Lessons from the past and issues for the future
The e-business hype is over and the next one is breaking ground -m-business. Waves of innovation are not new, neither for IS researchers nor for IS professionals. What can be learned from this wave of innovation? The next section suggests some implications of the case of DCXNET.
External Communication is important.
As we have seen, DaimerChrysler comunicated effectively with internal stakeholders. But external communication was important, too. The company was a late mover in an environment obsessed by speed. This approach can be effective, but it can be dangerous too. Firstly, in a company driven by shareholder value, analysts and rating agencies play a central role by interpreting business related information. The frame of reference of these people was, as major parts of the ‚internet economy' were, driven by the idea to make processes faster. Consultancies coined buzzwords like "B2B OR NOT TO BE" or "E OR BE EATEN". During the dot-com hype, patience was no attribute of shareholders and, as competitors announced their internet units to take advantage of a process innovation like e-business, pressure on DaimlerChrysler rose to do at least something. Despite the pressure from outside, the board demanded a well-informed e-business strategy on the basis of the corporate planning process. This provided for a deeper understanding of e-business and its impact on DaimlerChryslers operations. Based on this insight (and rising operating profits), the board could stand the pressure and deliver answers to analysts.
Assess the impact of the innovation on the industry structure and your business processes
First movers often command a premium for their ability to adapt new technology swiftly. The consequences of being a late mover depend on the impact an innovation has on business processes and industry structure. If information technology alters one or both, (e.g. decreasing costs per unit through economies of scale or increased process speed through electronic sales processes or overall networked processes), the late movers' margins will be squeezed and it can be too late, if competitors drive quality, prices or services in unreachable regions for companies which did not take advantage of the innovation earlier.
In that sense, e-business was no disruptive innovation for the car industry (until today). Neither established manufacturers nor market entrants succeeded in selling cars on the internet. Rather than being disruptive, e-business made some companies more efficient than others and allowed for process innovation that enhanced the quality of the core product.
Risk assessment and support of the IT function are crucial
This statement seems to be a commonplace, but was often neglected in the early days of ebusiness. As e-business is related to a set of socio-technical process and product innovations, risks may arise from technical, organizational and personal issues. Process innovations require the ability to change legacy processes and therefore means to accomplish change. The integration of legacy systems and e-business tools is not at all trivial and may fail without thorough analysis. The central IT Function of DaimlerChrysler played a vital role in assessing technology related risks and managing the integration of legacy systems into e-business solutions. Without the support of the CIO and her organization, DCXNET would not have been successful. The dot-com hype (and its downturn) around e -business damaged the reputation of the IT -and consulting industry severely. As Olaf Koch says: " The IT industry set the pace and sometimes people joined the hype without considering the risk. And when the hype was over, or "fool prove" technology failed, people had to deal with wrecked projects which will never achieve their business goals. This happened too often in the early days of ebusiness". Thus, one of the lessons that can be drawn from the story of DCXNET and its context is, that the IT-and consulting industry will have a hard time to reestablish trust in their relationships with clients and shareholders.
Alignment between IT and strategy is key
The DCXNET Initiative was a reaction on external pressure and the perception of the Lagezentrum, that an innovation might alter ways of doing business. One of the most important questions for IT management is the alignment of business needs and IT investments and how waves of IT innovation can be identified and dealt with proactively. Alignment between IT and strategy can be defined as "convergent intentions, shared understanding, and coordinated procedures" (Shams und Wheeler 2001). According to Chan (2002) , "Strategic alignment means the fit between the priorities and activities of the IS function and the business unit. The goal in strategic alignment is for IS priorities, capabilities, decisions, and actions to support the entire business. Structural alignment means the degree of "structural fit" between IS and the business. Structural fit relates to organizational structure and includes such areas as the location of IS decision-making rights, reporting relationships, (de)centralization of IS services and infrastructure, and deployment of IS personnel". In an empirical study which explored alignment in eight US-based firms, Chan (2002) reports four interesting observations:
1. Structural alignment varied by organization; there was no one right way. 2. IS strategic alignment mattered more than formal IS structural alignment. 3. Flexibility of IS structures was important. 4. The informal organizational structure important to IS alignment than commonly recognized.
Chan concludes, that the informal organizational structure might be the single most important aspect in creating the ability to exploit waves of IT innovation. That is, informal relationships between IT and other parts of the business can be viewed as the infrastructure of an early warning system for information systems innovations.
